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ABSTRACT
We employ archival evidence to investigate events culminating in 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, 
which followed disagreements over proit allocations arising from 
a previously negotiated concession. The case study expands the 
traditional obsolescing bargain model (OBM) by accommodating the 
use and impact of accounting information in negotiation contexts. 
The analysis reveals that managerial control and the deployment of 
accounting information by the AIOC temporarily strengthened its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the Iranian government leading up to the 
nationalisation crisis, demonstrating the potential importance of 
these new dimensions in wider contexts.
Introduction
In May 1951, following protracted negotiations and a resulting crisis, the Iranian government 
nationalised the local assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Many studies of similar 
expropriations have used the obsolescing bargaining model (OBM) to explain power shifts 
between the multinational enterprise (MNE) and host country (HC) government.1 In the 
model, the bargaining power of the MNE, however favourable the terms of entry, is under-
mined, or rendered obsolete, once sunk investments are made in the HC. Since the wave of 
oil and natural resource expropriations of the mid-twentieth century, MNEs have recently 
gained more bargaining power through the greater willingness of HC governments to co-op-
erate, for example via international institutions and trade organisations, which has led to 
the development of new models. These can be described as political bargaining models 
(PBM), of which the OBM is a speciic case.2 In PBM models, emphasis is placed on the ability 
of the MNE to use political process and resource control to obviate the tendency to 
obsolescence.
In this article, we suggest two further extensions of the PBM/OBM approach. These are 
irst, the roles of managerial control and accounting information. In MNE/HC bargaining 
situations, relative power is a function of staf deployments, particularly in roles demanding 
specialist knowledge. Whether overseas technical specialists appointed and trained by the 
MNE are used, or alternatively, locally recruited experts, can potentially govern the balance 
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of power between the MNE and HC. likewise, how accounting information is produced and 
disclosed, most usually at the behest of the senior management of the MNE, can strongly 
inluence the bargaining position. The second extension is to place the model in a dynamic 
and iterative context, such that entry conditions and early phase outcomes inluence sub-
sequent outcomes, and there are discontinuities or tipping points, meaning that the MNE’s 
bargaining position can obsolesce suddenly.
Using this approach illustrates the value of historical analysis in relation to the general 
international business literature, and provides an important justiication for analysing the 
AIOC case. Although the case is well known, and has been examined from a number of 
perspectives,3 it can potentially shed new light on the relationships implied by the OBM and 
its variants as outlined above. Moreover, by examining the role of accounting in the dynamic 
bargaining process, new evidence not hitherto examined in the business history or account-
ing literatures can be employed. In such fashion, the role of accounting in diplomatic con-
texts, or in bargaining situations between the MNE and HC, upon which the business history, 
accounting and wider literatures are currently silent, can be better understood.
These gaps in the literature lead us to our principal research questions, summarised as 
follows. First, how did bargaining gains split between the parties and how did they relect 
and in turn impact on their bargaining strategies? Second, did the AIOC use management 
control and accounting information to impact dynamically on the iterative negotiations 
leading up to the nationalisation crisis? Third, to what extent is the extension of the PBM/
OBM to include these dimensions warranted in the general case? Archival evidence, including 
new sources, is utilised in order to better answer these questions.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
on MNE/HC bargaining focusing on the OBM approach, leading to a conceptual framework 
extending the OBM to include management control, accounting information, and dynamic 
interactions. The third section discusses the research methodology and the framing of the 
Iranian nationalisation case study. In the fourth section, empirical evidence is introduced, 
examining the motivations of the main protagonists and how accounting was used in a 
series of bargaining situations. The conclusion summarises the main arguments.
Bargaining models 
The OBM is frequently referred to as the accepted paradigm of MNE-HC government relations 
in international political economy.4 In detail, the OBM explains the changing nature of bar-
gaining relations between an MNE and HC government as a function of the goals, resources 
and constraints of both parties.5 Gains for each party depend on relative bargaining power, 
determined by ability to withhold resources and capabilities, such as raw materials, capital, 
and technological and access to rare country-speciic advantages, such as valuable mineral 
resources.6 The outcome should favour the party with the strongest resources, highest issue 
salience, weakest constraints and greatest coercive power.7 relative bargaining power shifts 
to the HC government over time as the MNE transfers assets to the HC in the form of sunk 
investments, causing the original bargain to obsolesce. Some scholars argue that the OBM 
has outlived its usefulness, as HC governments have since become more co-operative 
towards MNE investors.8 Case studies that have tested the model reveal that MNEs often 
retain relative bargaining power and prevent HC governments from behaving opportunis-
tically so that bargains, in practice, are seldom obsolesced.9
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recognising these apparent weaknesses in the original OBM, certain modiications have 
been suggested. These have included the argument that MNE-HC relations are iterative 
political bargains negotiated between MNEs and HC governments over irm and country 
speciic resources, together with a variety of government policies at the industry level, inlu-
enced by, and linked to, alliances, interests and behaviour outside the speciic issue at stake. 
The outcomes can be also inluenced by governance inseparability, where previously agreed 
contracts are irreversible.10 Political aspects of MNE strategic behaviour, designed to generate 
irm-speciic advantage based on improved relationships with governments include resource 
commitment, personal relations, lobbying and political accommodation.11 Where the out-
come appears to favour the MNE in terms of distribution of gains, for example where the 
investment turns out to be more proitable than the original negotiations envisaged, the 
HC government’s perception of the beneit cost ratio may fall, potentially causing the bargain 
to obsolesce.12 The MNE’s use of accounting mechanisms to disguise the proitability of its 
operations is therefore of substantial potential signiicance.
Whilst acknowledging the value of general extensions to the OBM in the form of the PBM, 
it is noteworthy that they do not speciically accommodate the roles of managerial control 
of assets and the accounting function. likewise, the accounting literature, when considering 
colonial contexts has not considered the allocations of gains from MNE investments, nor the 
role of accounting in potentially distorting the proitability of such projects, concentrating 
more broadly on the role of proit and proit maximisation as a motive force of subordination 
in colonial contexts.13 Where managerial control and accounting are used in bargaining, the 
situation naturally evolves iteratively, demonstrating the value of the business history 
approach. Business historians have applied dynamic approaches to similar cases of MNE-HC 
bargaining accompanied by the threat of expropriation, for example US MNEs Kaisers in 
Ghana and the United Fruit Company in latin America.14 This article builds on these dynamic 
approaches by incorporating management control and accounting dimensions and inte-
grating them with the key facets of the OBM/PBM. Such an approach allows us to integrate 
the above literature review with our additional perspectives in the form of a conceptual 
framework through which MNE-HC government bargaining dynamics can be examined.
The framework is illustrated in Figure 1. Initial entry conditions set the framework for the 
relative bargaining power of the two sides. As in the OBM, the HC bargaining position is 
strengthened as the MNE makes sunk investments. The relative positions of both sides are 
mediated by HC public policies that apply to industry speciic issues, such as local regulation 
and access to markets, along with associated legitimation strategies by the MNE. For con-
venience, these factors are labelled as PBM bargaining enhancement factors in Figure 1. 
These dimensions are borrowed from the OBM and PBM perspectives, as outlined above. 
Further dimensions, speciied in Figure 1 are the MNE’s systems of management control and 
the production of accounting information. These dimensions are closely linked. Assets owned 
by the MNE, and their control by its managers, provide an important opportunity for corpo-
rate executives to use subjective decisions on valuation and information disclosure, whether 
in diplomatic contexts or through its inancial reporting function, to bolster their bargaining 
position. Bargaining enhancement factors can relect conlictual and co-operative motives 
in the bargaining process and the outcomes are relected in the relative distribution of gains. 
Insofar as these accrue to the HC, the traditional OBM applies, and insofar as they accrue to 
the MNE, the incremental factors arising from the PBM, management control and accounting 
are dominant and obsolescence is mitigated. The relative gains are further mediated by 
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political environments, which for the HC include the attitudes of stakeholder groups, includ-
ing employees, political parties and lobbies, and, for the MNE, include domestic shareholders 
and involvement with wider industry networks. The environments of both are linked through 
the operation of international diplomacy and participation in international and multi-lateral 
organisations. Accrual of gains from either side then, interacts positively and negatively with 
these environments, which determine the revised bargaining position of the participants in 
the next round of negotiations. A inal noteworthy feature of Figure 1, connecting the 
MNE-HC political environments, is the indirect emphasis attributed to geo-political and 
Initial entry 
conditions 
HC bargaining 
power 
HC bargaining 
enhancements 
PBM 
Sunk investments 
MNE bargaining 
enhancements 
PBM 
Management control 
and accounting 
information
HC relative gains MNE relative gains 
HC political 
environment 
International 
diplomatic relations 
MNE political 
environment 
MNE bargaining 
power 
Figure 1.  An extended bargaining model.
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diplomatic interactions, which can be substantial and complex, so that whilst the model has 
its primary focus of the dyadic nature of MNE-HC relations, it acknowledges such additional 
inluences as the aggregate of other powerful stakeholders. The relationships in Figure 1 
accommodate dynamic iterations, and for the purposes of presentational simplicity show 
the bargaining opportunities and gains to be in symmetry. In reality, the balance of bargain-
ing power and distribution of gains can tip in favour of one side or the other. As a conse-
quence, new bargaining strategies can emerge, if the gains are unbalanced, potentially also 
leading to rapid obsolescence of the checks and balances implied in the model.
The advantages of the conceptual framework are that it provides an overview of the main 
relationships suggested by the literature, with the addition of the new dimensions suggested 
from the above review. These relationships can now be examined further by considering 
empirical evidence. The next section outlines the rationale for choosing the AIOC case study, 
and the speciic focus of attention, as a means of further elaborating the conceptual 
framework.
Methodology and case study background
The case study examines the relationship between the AIOC and successive Iranian govern-
ments in the period 1933–1951. The reason for the selection of these dates is that 1951 was 
the year in which the Iranian government nationalised the local assets of the AIOC. In broad 
terms, the expropriation marked the obsolescence of the agreement made in 1933, which 
set the tone of the subsequent negotiations up to the crisis of 1951.
 As noted above, important novel dimensions are managerial control and the role of 
accounting information. The AIOC case is particularly useful in this respect, because from 
the outset, deployment of technical staf and proit and proit sharing were at the centre of 
MNE-HC negotiations and concessions. These issues were established from the outset, when 
the original concession, negotiated by William Knox d’Arcy, led to the discovery of signiicant 
new oil ield and the construction of a reinery at Abadan. The Anglo Persian Oil Company 
(the predecessor of the AIOC) was then established with the exclusive right to explore, 
develop, exploit, and transport petroleum in return for providing the Iranian government 
with 16% of the net proit on all operations.15 Subsequent negotiations led to the revision 
of this allocation, so that in 1933, a new agreement set the royalty paid to Iran at a ixed sum 
of 4 shillings (£0.20) per ton, plus 20% of the dividend payable to ordinary shareholders, and 
a minimum annual payment of £750,000, whilst local assets would be shifted to Iranian 
management through the employment of local staf in technical roles (referred to as 
‘Iranianisation’).16 As with accounting proit, Iranianisation provided AIOC executives with 
signiicant scope for voluntary action, reporting and interpretation.17
The problematic nature of proit determination and distribution between the MNE and 
HC has been noted in the literature. For example, Mansoor argues that, by the AIOC’s own 
admission, accurately calculating proits was complex,18 while Elm believes the British gov-
ernment manipulated dividends and taxes so that ‘Iran was left at the mercy of the British 
government, which by increasing AIOC’s taxes decreased the company’s net proits and thus 
decreased Iran’s 20% share in dividends and general reserves’.19 Keddie agrees, noting that 
the AIOC paid much more in income tax to the British government than it did in royalties to 
the Iranian government.20 Similar conlicts over proit and proit sharing arose with the 
second most important British business institution in Iran, the Imperial Bank, which was 
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accused of disguising its proits by making transfers to or from ‘inner’ or ‘secret’ reserves 
before reaching the published igure. The Imperial Bank’s ‘real’ proits were, on average, about 
twice as high as its published proits between 1890 and 1952.21
Although these prior studies acknowledge that accounting was at the centre of negoti-
ations in a number of contexts in Iran over a long period, there has been no systematic 
analysis of proit distribution or how proits were reported by the AIOC. To ill this gap there-
fore, using the BP Archive at Coventry, the article irst introduces new evidence drawn from 
the annual reports of the AIOC in the period 1933 to 1950.22 Second, the article uses further 
archival evidence in the form of memoranda and correspondence that sheds further light 
on how these accounting numbers were interpreted. The same evidence also facilitates our 
analysis of the exercise of management control, of which the use of accounting was an 
important component. Of particular signiicance in all these respects is the Gidel memoran-
dum. In 1948, to assist its renegotiation of the 1933 concession, the Iranian government 
appointed Gilbert Gidel, a French law Professor from the University of Paris. The crucial role 
of the memorandum was acknowledged in the literature,23 but its contents have not thus 
far been empirically analysed in detail. Gidel’s focus was on the accounting, governance and 
legal aspects of the agreement, and the contents of his memorandum are therefore of par-
ticular importance for our investigation below.24
AIOC/British and Iranian government bargaining, 1933–1951
This new evidence is now used to develop a case study focused on the use of accounting in 
the bargaining process between the AIOC and Iranian government over oil concessions and 
their renegotiation in the period from 1933 to the nationalisation crisis of the irst half of 
1951. The evidence is used to address each of the research questions in turn. The irst section 
below therefore discusses evidence on how the gains were distributed in the bargaining 
process. Having contextualised the process, the role of accounting information in negotia-
tions with speciic reference to the main points of contention, which centred on proit, proit 
distribution, and taxation is explained in the next section. The conclusion section following 
the case analysis includes a discussion of the generalisability of the model in Figure 1 with 
reference to the empirical indings.
Proits and proit sharing, 1933–1951
As noted earlier, an important ingredient of the OBM approach is the distribution of gains 
between the MNE and HC government. Such splits can depend on the initial entry conditions 
but also the evolution of relative bargaining strength of the parties. To examine the empirical 
trend so that the evolution of the bargaining process can be contextualised, the split of 
proits between the main claimants, the Iranian government, the British government and 
residual AIOC non-Iranian shareholders, is analysed in Table 1.
The igures in Table 1 are calculated from the AIOC Annual report and Accounts (1933–
1950). The distribution of proits between major claimants is shown in £000s and as percent-
ages of the total for each year. The distribution of proits relects the terms of the 1933 
agreement and the (51%) stake in the equity of the AIOC taken by the British government. 
residual, non-Iranian AIOC shareholders thus had a 49% stake in the equity and also con-
trolled the preference shares.25 All parties’ shares therefore depended on production levels, 
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but the distribution of gains between them also depended on oil prices, as the Iranian 
government received a ixed royalty per ton, and on the dividend policy of the AIOC exec-
utives; in other words, their decisions about whether to pay a high proportion of proits to 
shareholders as dividends, or to retain those proits as reserves.
As the trends in Table 1 show, the distribution of gains varied considerably through time. 
In the years immediately following the new concession in 1933, the Iranian government 
typically received less than 30% of proits. The high demand for oil during the post-war 
reconstruction of Europe enabled the company to achieve a rapid expansion in the volume 
of its sales and proits. These rose from £7.3 million in 1941 to £48.5 million in 1949 before 
more than doubling to approximately £83.6 million in 1950. Although the proits of the AIOC 
demonstrated a generally rising trend up to 1950, the gains were distributed unevenly. 
Indeed, in percentage terms, the Iranian government share rose during years of lower proit, 
as it received a relatively ixed proportion of a variable overall proit. The ixed price royalty 
and reliance on dividend distributions limited the percentage share falling to the Iranians 
to historically low levels after 1945. A further factor at work here was the much higher share 
accruing directly to the British government at the expense of both the Iranian government 
and residual AIOC shareholders. The new distribution can be explained by increases in taxes 
on proits levied by the British government during the post-1945 period.
At irst sight, the post 1945 distribution of gains in Figure 1 is the opposite of the predic-
tions of the OBM. In the pure OBM model, the gains to the MNE should decline at the expense 
of the HC as sunk investments increase. To assess the extent to which this was actually the 
case, Table 2 analyses the AIOC’s capital expenditure in the post-war period. As Table 2 shows, 
the AIOC invested a substantial proportion of its funds, the majority of which came from 
proitable operations in new ixed capital projects. However, as Table 2 also shows, the major-
ity of these funds were invested outside Iran, and the proportion tended to increase further 
Table 1. AIOC profit distribution, 1933–1950.
Notes: *Iranian government share consists of production royalties plus 20% of the ordinary dividend in excess of £671k. 
**Residual profits divided 51:49 between British Government, and other non AIOC Shareholders. ***AIOC profits are ad-
justed by adding back Iranian production royalties already deducted as a production cost in arriving at the disclosed profit 
per the report and accounts.
Sources: AIOC annual report, 1933–1950.
Iranian Government* British Government** AIOC shareholders** AIOC proits***
year £000s % £000s % £000s % £000s
1933 1,785 22.29 2,781 34.73 3,442 42.98 8,007
1934 2,159 25.22 2,978 34.79 3,423 39.99 8,560
1935 2,192 25.79 2,899 34.10 3,409 40.11 8,500
1936 2,580 30.08 2,967 34.59 3,031 35.33 8,577
1937 3,545 31.17 4,240 37.28 3,589 31.55 11,374
1938 3,307 34.55 3,214 33.58 3,050 31.87 9,571
1939 2,771 40.54 2,457 35.94 1,608 23.53 6,836
1940 2,786 37.35 3,204 42.95 1,469 19.70 7,459
1941 2,025 27.61 3,548 48.38 1,760 24.01 7,334
1942 3,428 25.40 6,886 51.03 3,181 23.57 13,494
1943 3,618 31.56 4,770 41.60 3,078 26.84 11,465
1944 4,460 36.01 4,779 38.74 3,128 25.25 12,387
1945 5,620 40.76 4,954 35.92 3,216 23.32 13,789
1946 7,130 37.32 6,974 36.51 4,999 26.17 19,103
1947 7,101 19.08 21,527 57.85 8,581 23.06 37,210
1948 9,175 16.65 35,013 63.56 10,907 19.80 55,090
1949 13,489 27.77 26,945 55.47 8,146 16.77 48,580
1950 16,032 19.18 53,902 64.47 13,671 16.35 83,605
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after 1946. In OBM terms, although the AIOC had substantial ixed investments in Iran, they 
did not increase substantially relative to investments elsewhere, suggesting that the com-
pany’s strategy was to reduce its dependence on Iran. In 1946, 94.62% of the AIOC’s activity 
was in Iran, relecting typical pre-war levels, but by 1950 this had fallen to 80.15%, with rapid 
increases in activity in Kuwait, Iraq and the UK.26 Furthermore, an apparent reluctance to 
carry through commitments on Iranianisation left British technical staf with substantial 
inluence over the deployment and operation of assets in Iran. In summary, the pattern of 
ixed capital investment was unlikely to erode the AIOC’s bargaining power.
 Taken together, the data in Tables 1 and 2 suggest a potential strengthening of the AIOC 
bargaining position. The revealed trends in the data provide important contextual back-
ground for analysing the negotiations between the AIOC and successive Iranian governments 
in the lead up to the nationalisation crisis. Unsurprisingly, the main variables in the tables, 
relating to capital expenditure royalties, dividend payments, and taxation were the subject 
of contentious negotiations. These are analysed further in the next section.
The concession bargaining process
An important reason for the 1933 renegotiation was that the Iranian government mistrusted 
the process of proit calculation that in turn determined its 16% share. The ixed royalty per 
ton and share in the dividend agreed in the 1933 concession were designed to overcome 
these objections, basing the Iranian share on parameters that were less subject to accounting 
manipulation.27 For the analysis that follows and with reference to Figure 1, the 1933 con-
cession forms the entry conditions for the next phase of the model. As the trends in the 
previous section suggest, the relatively ixed nature of the entry conditions meant the Iranian 
government did not participate equally once it was clear that proits would be larger than 
originally expected. In the eyes of the Iranian government, the bargain was obsolete and 
pressures to renegotiate mounted once again. In October 1947, the Iranian government 
passed a bill to initiate a renegotiation of the concession, seeking an increase in royalties 
and faster progress on Iranianisation.
The new measure relected PBM elements that potentially strengthened the Iranian gov-
ernment. Secular nationalist sentiments gained ground after 1945, leading to a strong polit-
ical backlash against British involvement in Iranian, mostly directed against the two leading 
businesses, the AIOC and the Imperial Bank.28 The leading nationalist politician, dr 
Table 2. Funds generated and location of capital expenditure: 1946–1951.
Notes: *Refers to long-term loan capital only as there were no equity share issues; **Excludes 1951, the year of the nation-
alisation crisis.
Sources: Adapted from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, Table 10.4, 276 and Figure 14.1, 348.
A B C d E
Funds generated 
from operations
Increase in long 
term capital*
Capital Expenditure 
(total)
Capital Expenditure 
(Iran) % d/C
1946 15.2 Nil 20.2 9.0 44.55
1947 43.9 Nil 31.0 8.0 25.81
1948 58.8 Nil 39.0 14.0 35.90
1949 43.1 1.6 55.7 18.0 32.32
1950 93.5 0.8 42.1 10.0 23.75
1951 83.2 4.2 60.2 n/a n/a
Totals 337.7 6.6 188.0 59** 31.38**
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Mohammed Musaddiq, used his increasing power base in the Iranian parliament to promote 
laws that potentially weakened the AIOC. The law of 2 december 1944, for example, pre-
vented the Iranian government from granting concessions to foreigners without the full 
agreement of parliament.29 The 1947 Bill also gave the Iranian government the right to take 
all necessary measures to secure Iran’s rights to her national resources where such rights 
had been violated.30 As Prime Minister in 1951, Musaddiq promulgated the law nationalising 
the AIOC’s assets in Iran. Musaddiq’s increasing political power base had been bolstered, at 
the expense of political groupings and institutions more inclined to compromise, by the 
distribution of relative gains in favour of the AIOC. These two factors, which might have led 
to rapid obsolescence of the 1933 concession, explain the AIOC’s rapid diversiication 
through its capital investment programme in the period 1946–1950.
In the face of rising nationalism, the AIOC’s bargaining position was strengthened through 
its powerful political connections. These arose from its strategic importance to Britain’s 
national economy and overseas interests.31 Efectively, ‘the company was mainly owned by 
the British government, its power was in the end that of Britain’.32 describing the AIOC in 
1959, Winston Churchill praised the historical role of ‘this great enterprise’ and its contribution 
to ‘national prosperity in peace and our safety in war’.33 In Iran, the AIOC was so dominant 
‘that it was efectively a state within a state and regarded to all intents and purposes as an 
arm of the British Admiralty and the British strategic policy’.34 In geo-political terms, the 
British government used the AIOC as an instrument of foreign policy to ight communism 
and advance the Anglo-American special relationship.35 At the same time, Iranian oil supplies 
were ‘a major source of soft currency generation and tax revenue for the British govern-
ment’.36 The Abadan oil reinery was the largest in the world and ‘a source of national pride’.37 
From a bargaining point of view, the AIOC was enormously strengthened by its control of 
the oil tanker leet, which could efectively deny any export revenues to Iran.38 In view of 
these resource and policy based advantages, the British government had a strong incentive 
to ensure that the key elements of the Iranian concessions remained in place.
Nonetheless, they recognised that nationalisation was a real threat. Most oicials in the 
Foreign Oice were of the opinion that it would be impossible to work the oilields without 
the support of the Iranians, especially if relationships became hostile.39 As Herbert Morrison, 
leader of the House of Commons and Foreign Secretary, relected at the height of the nation-
alisation crisis, if the Iranian oil supplies ceased to low from Iran ‘the consequences upon 
the economy, the life, and the political and strategic future of wide areas throughout the 
world would be disastrous since about a quarter of oil products that AIOC draw comes from 
Abadan’.40 For these reasons, the AIOC faced pressure to address the Iranian government’s 
concerns rather than allow them to escalate into more serious grievances.41
These political incentives and connections formally strengthened the bargaining position 
of the AIOC on the one hand, but on the other, impacted on the bargaining response of the 
Iranian nationalists. They believed with some justiication that the AIOC was acting on instruc-
tions from British government to efectively deprive the Iranian government of its reasonable 
share of revenues.42 As a consequence, both sides enlisted other PBM elements in this phase 
of the negotiations, which were manifested in the form of disputes about corporate gov-
ernance within the framework of local and international law. Notwithstanding the appoint-
ment of Gidel, a leading international lawyer, on the Iranian side, most of the advantages in 
these respects accrued to the AIOC through its strong connections with the British political 
establishment.
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 The Iranian government’s lack of trust in the policies and processes followed by the AIOC 
was the precursor for the issuance of the Gidel Memorandum (hereafter ‘the Memorandum’. 
Gidel summarised the Iranian concerns, to which the AIOC provided a point-by-point 
response.43 The Iranian government was irmly of the belief that their negligible share of the 
oil proits was the result of AIOC’s unnecessary expenditure on activities and goods that 
were designed to satisfy certain inluential people as opposed to genuinely being used for 
public welfare.44 The Iranian case in the Memorandum was thus based on a claim that proits 
earned in Iran were being invested elsewhere by the AIOC, and that Iran would thus be 
deprived of its share of proits from these operations. In addition, the Memorandum noted 
that the company had denied Iranian requests to inspect its books for the purposes of 
ascertaining the accuracy of royalty and other payments. The Memorandum also pointed 
out that the AIOC had not improved the working conditions of the Iranian workforce and 
that foreign personnel had not been reduced in line with agreements.45
 Meanwhile, in response to the Iranian instigated negotiations, the AIOC now enlisted 
new elements, including the use of managerial control and inancial reporting to bolster its 
position. Neville Gass, Managing director of AIOC and the AIOC negotiator in 1939, noted 
that his Iranian counterparts ‘possessed only a very elementary idea of accounts’.46 Gass’s 
successor, AIOC Chairman Sir William Fraser,47 and his management team, therefore believed 
themselves to be in a good position to use their control of assets and cash lows and asso-
ciated accounting arguments as a tool to defend their position against the Iranian govern-
ment’s claims. These claims are now set out in detail, by order of substantive point, referring 
to the Memorandum’s bargaining demand in the irst instance and then to the AIOC’s 
response.
Concerning the deinition of proit and the Iranian share of these proits, the Memorandum 
called for the method of calculation of the company’s various reserves to be clariied in an 
accurate manner.48 The memorandum also claimed that the AIOC’s depreciation calculations 
unfairly reduced proits and, therefore, the amount of money paid to the Iranian govern-
ment.49 It pointed out that the Iranian government would, in efect, have paid toward the 
depreciation of properties outside Iran to which it had no legal ownership at the end of the 
concession. In addition, it suggested that the government would also have paid toward the 
depreciation of the company’s properties in Iran and that these assets should revert to the 
government at the end of the concession free of any cost. However, the AIOC’s intention 
was that the ordinary stockholders would beneit from the reserves at the end of the con-
cession and from the company’s property outside Iran, while the government would have 
no reversionary right to the property inside Iran.50
For the Iranians, the lack of control over proit determination and distribution was made 
worse by the AIOC’s methods of appropriating proits to reserves. Ali Mansur,51 a negotiator 
on the Iranian side, commented that the proits and reserves were implausibly large and 
advised that ownership rights associated with them should be clariied so that the interests 
of Iran were completely safeguarded.52 He stated that the:
… AIOC has acted under instructions from the British government and reserved terriic amounts 
in order not to pay more than what the company laid down in the 1933 agreement. However, it 
should be stipulated in the supplemental agreement that the Iranian government would share 
in all the reserves up to 20% whether visible or invisible.53
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In other words, the Iranians were anxious to specify their share in terms of all proits, whether 
distributed as dividends or not and regardless of how undistributed proits were speciied 
in the company’s reserves.
The AIOC negotiators took a diferent view. They argued that the only amount available 
to the Iranian government was 20% of the company’s general reserve at the date of expiration 
of the concession or of its surrender.54 To justify the deduction of depreciation on all assets, 
including those outside Iran, in arriving at the proits in which the Iranian government was 
entitled to participate, the AIOC noted that overseas assets amounted to less than 1% of the 
total gross value.55 Other reserves, such as those for taxation, contingencies and deferred 
repairs, bad debts, stores stock, etc. could not be calculated ‘with absolute accuracy’ and 
were not likely to be payable to shareholders unless they were found to have been over-
stated.56 The AIOC position, and the share of proit immediately available to the Iranians, 
therefore depended signiicantly on the validity of estimates made by its managers about 
contingent expenses. Application of the accounting prudence principle, under which liabil-
ities must be accrued when foreseen, provided a strong inancial reporting based defence 
of the AIOC position. The foreseeability of the expenses in question was entirely a matter of 
the subjective judgement of AIOC managers, who were free if they chose, to make generous 
estimates of likely costs, thereby forcing the Iranian government to defer its share of 
proits.
 The bargaining strategy might have succeeded had the Iranian side been suiciently 
induced to trust the accounting judgements of AIOC managers. However, such trust was in 
increasingly short supply. The demand in the Memorandum that the AIOC should open its 
books for government inspection57 hinted at Iranian oicials’ perception of the questionable 
nature of the accounting policies and their associated lack of trust in the judgement of AIOC 
managers. In short, the AIOC refused the demand for inspection citing the apparent objec-
tivity of the basis of payments to the Iranian government and commercial expediency. 
Considering the AIOC case for refusal in more detail however, it is apparent that these argu-
ments were merely a smokescreen. The Memorandum based the requirement for inspection 
on the subjectivity of managerial accounting decisions, to which the AIOC responded that 
the amount distributed as proit by way of dividend was an objective and indisputable 
measure.58 Notwithstanding the literal truth of this statement, the actual amount of the 
dividend was of course a subjective matter entirely under the control of AIOC management. 
Moreover, the more those managers chose to limit the proportion of proit paid as a dividend, 
the greater the amount credited to reserves, and greater the scope for them to manipulate 
those reserves using accounting estimates. As far as inspecting the books was concerned, 
therefore, simply asserting that the requirement was obviated by the apparent objectivity 
of the Iranian share was irrelevant. In putting up this smokescreen, the AIOC was refusing 
to countenance the bargaining point raised on the Iranian side about reversion of assets at 
the end of the concession.
 As the evidence in Table 1 suggests, the share of proit attributable to the British govern-
ment rose rapidly after 1945 as a function of changes to taxation rates. The Iranian govern-
ment percentage share was reduced in equal proportion. The Memorandum’s substantive 
claims were that British tax should not have been deducted from the Iranian government’s 
proit share, and that the AIOC underpaid Iranian tax on its proits because of the immunities 
it enjoyed. The Memorandum also requested the restoration of its share of proits lost his-
torically due to these arrangements. To support the case, Gidel constructed a table 
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comparing taxes paid to both the British and the Iranian government from 1933 to 1947 
inclusive, reproduced here as Table 3.
As the data in Table 3 show, both governments experienced increases in taxation receipts 
during the period of the 1933 concession. Amounts paid to the two governments were 
approximately equal at the outset, but between 1933 and 1947 the Iranian share increased 
by a factor of 2.79, whilst the British government’s share increased by a factor of 50.01. The 
increase of the British government share was most pronounced after 1943 when income 
tax was supplemented by excess proit tax.59 Gidel argued that without immunities from 
local customs duties and taxes, the amount received by the Iranian government would have 
around £17million in 1947,60 and commensurate therefore with the increases that had gone 
to the British government.
A further aspect of British iscal policy that was particularly relevant to the concessionary 
discussions was the limitation of company dividends. In 1945 the British government called 
irst for voluntary restraints on dividends and subsequently introduced diferential proit 
taxes with higher rates on dividends and lower rates on retentions.61 These policies relected 
domestic political pressures in a period of wage restraint, and also supply side policies aimed 
at encouraging investment in the British economy. However, due to the nature of the 1933 
concession, these policies also limited the Iranian proit share. The AIOC therefore came 
under Iranian pressure to increase the dividend, but the company received direct instructions 
from the British Chancellor of the Exchequer not to do so. As a consequence, although proits 
rose rapidly, for the three years after 1947, the AIOC dividend payment remained unchanged.62
The discrepancy between the sums paid to the British government and Iranian govern-
ments unsurprisingly led to Iranian pressures for re-negotiation from a number of quarters, 
within and outside the government.63 Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of Bank Melli, argued 
for a fairer distribution in favour of Iran.64 Mansur argued that the AIOC enjoyed a range of 
privileges from their operation in Iran such as cheap labour, exemption from customs duties 
and charges, exemption from income tax, and freedom to import and export as it liked. He 
added that the negligible share of revenue received in return was shocking to Iranian public 
opinion.65 The Iranian government claimed the payment structure relected that the AIOC 
Table 3. Taxes paid by the AIOC to the British and Iranian governments.
Note: From 1943, the British government tax receipts included normal income tax and also excess profit tax.
Source: BP 101099, Gidel Memorandum, 1946-1949, 6b.
Total tax payable
year British government (£) Iranian Government (£)
1933 305,418 274,412
1934 511,733 301,135
1935 408,635 291,169
1936 910,559 328,524
1937 1,651,588 362,734
1938 1,157,029 378,494
1939 1,955,606 466,204
1940 2,975,156 460,118
1941 2,920,682 568,667
1942 4,917,486 454,168
1943 7,662,764 606,948
1944 10,636,457 514,725
1945 10,681,364 646,644
1946 10,279,241 768,599
1947 15,266,665 765,405
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was simply ‘the British Government under another form’.66 It was certainly the case, as the 
data in Tables 1 and 3 suggest, that the British government, through the collection of such 
taxes, heavily skewed the gains from the concession away from Iran relecting the AIOC/
British government joint control of assets and inancial claims upon them.
Nonetheless, it suited the AIOC to claim a separation of its own interests from the British 
government for negotiating purposes. The company argued that British tax provisions were 
beyond its control, and British taxes were a matter for the British government. Furthermore, 
the AIOC argued that the Iranian government enjoyed beneits from investments that would 
have been impossible if the company had not been given tax immunity. The AIOC also 
claimed that the taxes represented revenues that would have been unavailable without the 
company’s investments, as oil reserves would otherwise have not been discovered and devel-
oped.67 The company’s negotiating stance in its response to these speciic points also 
relected the more general expectation of AIOC executives that Iranians should be grateful 
for its investments.68
In terms of the OBM, it is noteworthy that as AIOC sunk investments increased, the Iranian 
gains from the bargain reduced, substantially as a function of tax arrangements. Co-operative 
actions by the HC government, along the lines of the PBM modiication likewise strengthened 
the bargaining position of the AIOC. As the discussion above makes clear, managerial control 
of assets and how they were accounted for, strongly underpinned the bargaining power of 
the AIOC. As a consequence, the accounting and governance-based arguments assembled 
in the Memorandum cut little ice with the AIOC negotiators.
However, the dynamic nature of the bargaining process meant that as the AIOC strength-
ened its position using accounting arguments, the Iranian side was now strongly pressured 
by the absence of a way forward on the basis of international law. The outcome of the 
negotiations did nothing to assuage public opinion. The unfairness of the distribution of 
gains, and lack of recourse through international legal institutions, had been made more 
transparent by the negotiation process, notwithstanding the attempted obfuscations of the 
AIOC. As the evidence in Tables 1–3 show, without the need to raise signiicant new capital, 
the proits of the AIOC were large and used increasingly to divert funds to new investment 
opportunities outside Iran.
In relation to the OBM conceptual framework described at the outset of this paper, the 
evidence illustrates the role of accounting in mitigating bargain obsolescence. Managerial 
control over assets and accounting policies strongly bolstered the bargaining position of 
the AIOC. These mechanisms were closely integrated with the iscal and national and inter-
national institutions, all of which underpinned the accounting arguments and further 
strengthened the AIOC position. The consequent distribution of gains, already strongly 
favouring the AIOC, was maintained and added to through further iterations of the bargain-
ing process.
The corresponding lack of recourse to conventional bargaining channels on the Iranian 
side was compounded by the radical transformation of Iranian politics. The large gains appro-
priated and the very strength of the AIOC’s negotiating position in defending these gains 
now provoked the nationalisation of its Iranian assets. On the 1st of May 1951, the Iranian 
nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammed Musaddiq, introduced the nationalisation bill ‘For 
the happiness and prosperity of the Iranian nation’.69 Consequently, British technicians aban-
doned Iran, and Britain declared a worldwide embargo on Iranian oil, dramatically reducing 
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oil production. Iranian assets were frozen in British currency, and exports prohibited. As the 
crisis unfolded, British business in Iran diminished to a single irm of contractors.70
Conclusion
Using important archival sources and inancial analysis of annual reports, the AIOC-Iran case 
has provided empirical evidence in support of a reformulation of OBM/PBM type models. 
The modiied model integrates key contributions from existing scholarship on MNE-HC bar-
gaining while also demonstrating that these generic bargaining power models can be 
extended through the inclusion of accounting as a variable, which the management of the 
MNE controls in parallel with sunk asset investments. Accounting can mitigate the obsoles-
cence normally associated with the build-up of such investments over the period of a 
concession.
 In the AIOC-Iran case, management controlled accounting policies relating to deprecia-
tion, treatment of reserves, proit distribution and retention and the efects of taxation were 
used efectively as bargaining counters. Iranian claims concerning the inequitable conse-
quences of these policies were no doubt justiied, as the distribution of gains revealed, and 
AIOC responses were mere smokescreens. However, the proprietorial nature of accounting 
information, underpinned by international law and institutions, rendered it non-contestable 
from the Iranian point of view.
 Such non-contestability efectively closed down conventional diplomatic channels for 
the renegotiation of the 1933 concession, sparking its rapid obsolescence via a political 
revolt against the AIOC in 1951. The case thereby illustrates the value of analysing the iter-
ative and dynamic nature of these OBM/PBM models using a historical approach. In the 
AIOC-Iran case, obsolescence was sudden and was a function of the absence of balance in 
bargaining channels and skewed distribution of gains away from the HC in favour of the 
MNE.
This article makes an important contribution to business history and studies on the OBM 
by highlighting the pivotal role that the accounting methods played in the on-going nego-
tiations between the AIOC and the Iranian government. Furthermore, this research empha-
sises the role of accounting in bargaining and negotiation situations and how it can reinforce 
unequal power relations in colonial and similar international post-colonial contexts where 
a dominant MNE aims to exploit local resources.
The dynamic role of accounting was clear in the AIOC case, suggesting its possible impor-
tance in the more general case. research using OBM/PBM models, whether applied in his-
torical or present day contexts, should therefore at least consider it as a potentially inluential 
factor. To assess the wider signiicance, however, further research is required. More empirical 
evidence on how MNEs use their accounts to exercise control over local populations, their 
resources and their governments can potentially inform a wide range of historical and current 
debates on the evolution and efectiveness of global institutions of governance.
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